Contested representations of psychology and science: The use and abuse of psychological arguments and evidence in the race debate

Abstract

The essay by Butler (1998) is timely and thought-provoking. While many are at least conversant with the challenges and critiques of Danziger (1990), Gergen (1985, 1994), Sampson (1993, 1994), Shotter (1993), John (1986, 1994), and others with respect to the at-times studiously unreflective character of psychology, there has been a tendency to let the present swing of the pendulum towards a more conservative orthodoxy and a heavily biological “biopsychosocial” framing of psychological issues serve as a kind of rebuttal and validation of the “scientific” and positivist core and raison d'etre of psychology. As well, the average psychologist may be less than clear about what is an informed response to the Bell Curve debate (e.g., Fraser, 1995; Jacoby &Glauberman, 1995), and may well feel that the “controversy” is more about political correctness than the inherently political nature of scientific research and findings. These possibly typical responses neither acknowledge or seriously consider the ideological character and context of psychological theory and practice, nor the directions that biological cum psychological determinism takes us. While Butler's essay could be seen as just another intellectual skirmish on the battleground of psychology as science versus history (e.g., Gergen, 1994; Smith, 1994), it goes further than most such articles in engaging a critical reflexivity on the part of the average reader, who might well have perused the article for a bit of validation and argument with which to counter the worrying number of postmodern critics and students who at times seem resolute on pillorying both psychology and positivism.