Abstract
We study the demand and supply implications of occupational licensing using transaction-level data from a large online platform for home improvement services. We find that demand is more responsive to a professional’s reviews than to the professional’s platform-verified licensing status. We show some evidence that consumers view licenses and reviews as substitutes. We confirm the generality of our findings off the platform in an independent consumer survey. Combining state-level licensing regulation data with platform microdata, we find that more stringent requirements are associated with less competition, higher prices, and no increase in demand or consumer satisfaction. (JEL D18, J44, L74, L84)
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