Abstract
Moral rights are often characterized as having a special relationship to agency. But the link between agency and rights is often thought to pose an obstacle to the attribution of rights to children. Since children are not mature agents, they cannot be proper bearers of rights or at least of rights grounded in agency. This paper provides a way around this obstacle. Drawing on a form of constructivism, I argue that some rights can be attributed to children in virtue of their status as juvenile agents. I offer a characterization of the agency of children and to indicate how it provides a justificatory basis for distinctive rights of children.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
