Choices, Interests, and Potentiality: What Distinguishes Bearers of Rights?

Abstract

The problem to be discussed in this paper is how to demarcate the class of subjects who are bearers of rights in a morally acceptable, non-arbitrary way, while avoiding the problem of undue proliferation of rights bearers. The general shape of the argument is as follows. In section 2, I address the urgency and significance of this problem: all rights theories need to address the problem of demarcation of the class of rights bearers. In section 3, define the adequacy criteria of a plausible solution to this problem: (1) The account should be morally acceptable in the sense that it should at least not exclude adults capable of agency, temporarily unconscious adults, and children as rights bearers. Claiming that a morally acceptable theory should include these subjects as rights bearers is widely endorsed, though not undisputed; (2) The account should be non-arbitrary in the sense that it should provide a systematic, principled justification for the demarcation of the class of rights bearers; (3) It should, finally, avoid undue proliferation of rights bearers. Arguably, all sentient creatures fall within the realm of morality, but not all of them are properly classified as rights bearers. In section 4, I defend a new solution to the problem of demarcation. I argue that the solution to the problem of demarcation is going to focus on the moral relevance of the physical constitution necessary for agency, and that the implication of this is that not only comatose human adults and children can be rights-bearers but also foetuses. Another implication is that nonhuman animals and groups cannot be rights-bearers. The question of what subjects actually do have moral rights is distinct from the question of what subjects it is meaningful and conceptually coherent to ascribe