Abstract

Have the congressional budget committees' spending targets provided stringent budget constraints for appropriators? That is, are these budget targets below or above the levels that appropriators would have agreed to in the absence of the budget process? The author estimates a model based on appropriations data from before budget reforms were enacted to forecast budget appropriations figures in the postreform era. He then compares these predicted budget figures with actual Budget Committee targets (602[b] suballocations) to assess the degree of budget restraint. The author concludes from the analysis that the budget process has not generally operated as a procedural spending restraint on House appropriators, although the targets have been constraining in the early 1990s and have served a partisan role for congressional Democrats in redirecting spending priorities from defense to domestic nondefense appropriations.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call