Abstract

The authors have conducted the political and legal analysis of such phenomena in modern civilization as constitutionalism and populism, their value and institutional foundations, and the negative impact of populist parties on the constitution transformations under democratic transition. The article proves that populists treat any legal procedures and institutions negatively, particularly those that cannot sat-isfy their goals. A means of political struggle populist parties resort to is the diminution of judiciary independence and the role of constitutional jurisdiction bodies. The experience of Central and Eastern European countries shows that it is almost impossible to combine populist legislation with the inde-pendence of constitutional jurisdiction bodies. The article emphasizes that populist parties, which enjoy a high credit of public trust, are trying to expand their powers by adopting populist constitutions.

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