Abstract
The science of constitutional law lacks universal theoretical approach to constitutional legal relations; each state independently determines the goals, object and subject of constitutional legal relations. At the same time, the same subjects in different conditions existing in different national legal systems can act as objects and subjects of legal relations. The constitutional legal relations constructs under consideration do not consider a nation as an equal participant in these legal relations. Their role in all of the presented constructs is limited both in terms of the circle of persons and the possibilities to enter into constitutional legal relations as a subject. It can be argued that, despite the difference in approaches to the object and subject composition of legal relations, in Germany, Great Britain and France, such legal relations between public authorities can exist only in a normally developing state (a state that is not under pressure from any crisis or epidemic).The author draws her conclusion based on an analysis of the basic constructs of legal relations, which in Russian legal science are usually referred to as constitutional legal relations. The author’s choice of constructs developed in Germany, Great Britain and France is due to the wide spread in the world of scientific views formed within the framework of the national scientific schools of these states, as well as the influence of the philosophy of law of Germany and France on the formation of constitutional legal relations in Russia.The author pays special attention to the prevalence of Karl Schmitt’s views on the formation of constitutional legal relations in Europe and North America in terms of intolerance of dissent, the assumption of constitutional dictatorship, the strengthening of executive power at the expense of the legislature.
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