Abstract

We study the Shapley NTU solution on the class of ssNTU games for which the feasible set of the grand coalition is given by a hyperplane (G-hyperplane games). It is shown that, by considering payoff configurations as solution outcomes, the Shapley NTU value is consistent according to a generalization of the reduced game proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell to the class of NTU games. Moreover, the Shapley NTU solution is characterized on this class of NTU games by means of this consistency property plus some plausible axioms, namely: maximality, covariance, symmetry, a null-player axiom, and an additional axiom requiring certain coherence in the payoffs of the intermediate coalitions.

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.