Considering Soviet Threats to the Persian Gulf

Abstract

l hile the United States has been aware of its vital stakes in the oil-rich Persian Gulf for some time, American concern about the vulnerability of the U.S. position in that region is more recent. Historically, the internal stability of the region was of little concern because the area was controlled by conservative monarchies with small and relatively docile populations. Also, the general security of the region seemed assured by the British, who acted as the arbiters of local disputes and the guardians against external threats. When the British withdrew from East of Suez in 1971, the United States sought a new formula for regional security and settled on a twin pillar approach, depending on the Iranians and to a lesser extent the Saudis to guarantee regional stability and security. With the collapse of one of these pillars and the shakiness exhibited in the other (which was in any case never a military power), Americans became aware of the need to find a new basis for regional security. Adding urgency to this search was the growing shadow Soviet power cast over the area. Improved Soviet ability to project power, the erosion of Northern Tier barriers to Soviet access to the region, the Soviet foothold along the periphery of the area, and the growing Soviet naval presence in the south, all fundamentally affected the security calculus of the local states and made Americans far more concerned about the Soviet threat in an already shaky, yet critical region. Not surprisingly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan served to crystallize American concerns about, and commitment to, countering Soviet threats in the Persian Gulf. Though there are threats to U.S. interests in the region that are internally generated and may be independent of the Soviets-the current war between Iran and Iraq being a case in point-the purpose of this essay is to discuss the somewhat more narrow theme of Soviet threats to the Persian Gulf.