An Australian View

Abstract

N i -ATURE has placed Australia east of Suez, and she will remain there. So her problem is not whether to have an 'east of Suez' policy, but which one to have-which possible enemies to guard against, which allies to seek and which countries to try to influence. If Britain has an east of Suez policy, this must be viewed in the general perspective of Australian relations with Asian countries and those, such as the United States, with special interests in Asia. If Britain decides not to have an east of Suez policy, Australia must still try to fit this fact into the framework of her general situation. Given the arrangements of the past and present, any British change of policy is of the greatest importance to Australia. But there is a difference between British and Australian consideration of the whole issue of involvement with Asia: a British withdrawal to Europe is perfectly possible, whereas Australia has nowhere but her own continent to withdraw to. Britain can take a world view in this matter, adjusting her Asian policy to her European policy, and viewing both in terms of her relations with the United States; Australia, while also affected by major world trends, must view Asian questions as in a sense domestic. The official Australian approach to problems arising east of Suez may be stated in terms of particular areas, given the general point that Asian developments of any magnitude are of first importance to Australia because of her location. Of those areas which British policy must necessarily take into account, in terms of existing commitments, the Middle East and Persian Gulf areas are of least importance to Australia. There has been a marked decline in Australian concern for these places since the Suez affair of 1956. Before then, it was still common practice to refer to the Middle East as part of Australia's 'life-line,' whereby goods and people went to and from Britain. The fact that Australian troops had fought in the Middle East in two world wars served to dramatise the position, and to make conventional assessments of strategy hinge upon the maintenance of British power there. Since 1956 interest has been concentrated further east in Asia, mainly in South-East Asia, the part nearest to Australia. The fact that the 'life-line' remains open, in spite of British reverses and highly unstable politics in the Middle East, has probably contributed to Australian lack of interest; the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf is important, since Australia derives 71 per cent.