Consciousness Without Content: A Look at Evidence and Prospects.

Narayanan Srinivasan

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01992

Abstract

Many traditions in the East have proposed that consciousness without content is possible and could be achieved with mental training. However, it is not clear whether such a state is possible given that intentionality is a critical property of mentality and consciousness in many theories of consciousness. A prominent recent attempt to account for such states of “minimal phenomenal experience” is the ascending reticular arousal system (ARAS) model, which proposes a specific type of non-conceptual representational content to address such a state. Consciousness without content can also be understood by studying related or similar states of minimal phenomenal experience and this paper discusses such findings from such states including dreamless sleep experience and their implications. One way to argue for the need for proposing consciousness without content is to locate a property of consciousness that would necessitate postulating it. A continuous state of consciousness without content may be needed to understand continuity of conscious experience. Finally, I discuss the implications of consciousness without content for current theories of consciousness.

Highlights

Multiple contemplative traditions report exceptional experiences and these experiences pose critical questions for the study of consciousness (Thompson, 2014; Metzinger, 2019)
If a state of consciousness without content (Turiya or Nirvana) does exist, how do we study it? This paper sympathetically explores the possibility of consciousness without content and discusses possible ways to attack this problem
Windt (2015) proposes that “dreamless sleep experience can be described as pure temporal experience” and could be considered a minimal phenomenal experience

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Multiple contemplative traditions report exceptional experiences and these experiences pose critical questions for the study of consciousness (Thompson, 2014; Metzinger, 2019) These exceptional experiences have been used to characterize and define states of consciousness. Kashmir Shaivism talks of seven states of Turiya or bliss (Lakshmanjoo, 2017) in terms of progressive steps achieved through practice These include nijananda (the bliss of your own self), nirananda (devoid of limited bliss), prananda (the bliss of breathing), brahmānanda (the bliss which is all-pervading), mahananda (the great bliss), cidānanda (the bliss of consciousness), and jagadānanda (universal bliss). Based on phenomenological reports and analysis, Metzinger (2019, 2020) postulates certain phenomenological constraints for the minimal phenomenal experience (MPE) They are tonic alertness, absence of intentional content or content of “absence,” self-luminosity, introspective availability, epistemicity, and transparency. If it is the case that there is no sense of self or time, how could one remember that one was in such a state sans content or remember the duration or onset of such a state? In addition, it points to the fact that the experience and its report could be affected by the expectations and theories associated with such experiences in various contemplative traditions

STATES CLOSE TO CONSCIOUSNESS WITHOUT CONTENT

Dreamless Sleep Experience

CONTINUITY OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE

CONSCIOUSNESS WITHOUT CONTENT AND THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

CONCLUSIONS

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS