Abstract
Theories of consciousness can be separated into those that see it as cognitive in nature, or as an aspect of cognitive functioning, and those that see consciousness as importantly distinct from any kind of cognitive functioning. One version of the former kind of theory is the higher-order-thought theory of consciousness. This family of theories posits a fundamental role for cognitive states, higher-order thought-like intentional states, in the explanation of conscious experience. These states are higher-order in that they represent the subject herself as being in various world-directed first-order states and thus constitute a kind of cognitive access to one's own mental life. This distinctive cognitive access is postulated to account for what it is like for one to have a conscious experience.
Highlights
Edited by: Aleksandra Mroczko-Wasowicz, National Yang Ming University, Taiwan Reviewed by: Lucia Melloni, Max Planck Institute for Brain Research, Germany
The basic argument is that, overall, the balance of evidence favors the identification of phenomenal consciousness with firstorder non-cognitive states rather than our cognitive access to those states
The higher-order thought theory can allow that our phenomenal consciousness overflows working memory
Summary
This family of theories posits a fundamental role for cognitive states, higherorder thought-like intentional states, in the explanation of conscious experience. This is important because, unlike other theories, the higher-order thought theory can allow that our conscious experience overflows working memory.
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