Abstract
This article seeks to contribute to understanding how and under what conditions agreements are made between the Executive and Legislative Branches in the production of structural reforms in Brazil. The negotiations between the two powers are analyzed through two cases of privatization policy in the first term of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso Administration. The cases are approached through an analytical narrative combining history and policymaking with the rational choice theory. A theoretical model based on coordination of interests is applied to the cases, based on two interacting areas of negotiation: partisan and distributive.
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