Confronting the UN drug control behemoth

Abstract

Two articles in this issue of the International Journal of Drug Policy disperse much of the fog swirling around the UN institutions and legal instruments dealing with illegal drugs (Fazey, 2003; Bewley-Taylor, 2003). What appears through the mist is not always heartening, and hardly flattering of the UN. In many ways, the components of the UN drug control apparatus appear like a seriously dysfunctional family, causing positive harm to those under its influence. Fortunately, these articles point to a way out of the international straitjacket that has for so long impeded reform. Proponents of drug law and policy reform inevitably confront the United Nations drug control conventions and their interwoven UN bureaucracies. ‘‘The drug control treaties won’t allow it’’ is a familiar refrain sung by both defenders of the status quo and the more cautious of reformers. Reformers recognise the need to factor the UN into their efforts, but their lack of understanding of the dynamics of the international drug control bureaucracy and treaties makes it almost impossible to determine how to work with that bureaucracy and those treaties. Given the historical reluctance of UN drug control bureaucracies to shift their thinking and policies, some question whether it is even worth trying to involve the UN in reform efforts. Which organisations can be trusted to work in the interests of sound drug policy? Which organisations have real influence on the shape of policies, and who within those organisations has influence? And how does one respond to the influential US role in UN organisations in responding to drug control issues? The more naive or trusting among reformers may believe that the UN drug control bureaucracy weighs public policy considerations more heavily than political considerations in its work. In The Commission of Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme: Politics, Policies the Prospect for Change , Professor Cindy Fazey pointedly reveals the less noble forces at play. She speaks with the authority of a former insider, having served for 8 years with the UN International Drug Control Programme in Vienna. Her analysis is sharply critical of the UN organisations that administer drug policies. She describes organisations populated by self-interested, self-deluding, risk-averse and manipulative bureaucracies, too often serving not the public good, but theirs and that of their bureaucratic allies. Professor Fazey walks the reader through the formal UN drug control hierarchy. But more important are her insights into what drives the policies of these organisations. She argues that reform can be stifled by international civil servants who prefer inaction to taking action that may prove wrong. Then come the other interests that impede progress within international organisations*/the networks and friendship groups, national allegiances, the ability of some bureaucrats to manipulate the system for their own personal gain, the reluctance of others to step out of line lest their careers be cut short or their next posting be Lagos, far from the comforts of Vienna. Add to that the suffocating influence on policy exerted by the major donors and the inflexible ideology they bring with them. In the end, we are left with the harsh view that political self-interest and the power of the pocketbook, rather than sound public policy drives reform*/or, more accurately, resistance to reform, at the international level. Professor Fazey’s analysis is sometimes disheartening (typified by her mention of the vacuous UN slogan, ‘‘A Drug Free World*/We Can Do It’’), but necessary * Tel.: /1-613-238-5909; http://www.cfdp.ca. E-mail address: eugene@oscapella.ca (E. Oscapella). International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 203 /204