Confronting Kant and Kierkegaard

Abstract

Abstract This chapter considers in more detail how it is that the kind of natural law approach embodied in Løgstrup’s ‘ontological ethics’ puts him at odds with both Kant and Kierkegaard, and leads him to convict them of formalism. Løgstrup’s claim is that by failing to adopt his approach, neither Kant nor Kierkegaard can do justice to the ethical demand, as they see it as deriving from the authority of a commander. The difficulty is that such authority is ‘content-independent’ in H. L. A. Hart’s sense, making the reason to act that one has been commanded, rather than the vulnerability of the other person, which in these situations should be the right reason on which to act. If Løgstrup is correct, it is argued that his critique also has significant implications against contemporary attempts to ground ethical obligation in the authority of practical reason and divine command respectively.