Normativity as Natural Law

Abstract

Abstract This chapter argues that Løgstrup’s position on the question of moral obligation is closest to a natural law outlook, not only in The Ethical Demand but also in later works when he speaks of his ‘ontological ethics’ and ‘the sovereign expressions of life’ (§7.1). Alasdair MacIntyre’s claim that Løgstrup is not a natural law theorist (§7.2), and also Stephen Darwall’s claim that in this earlier work Løgstrup was a divine command theorist (§7.3), are both considered and rejected. The next section argues that the natural law theory Løgstrup adopted is non-theistic rather than theistic (§7.4). Finally, this account of Løgstrup as a natural law theorist is connected to subsequent chapters, where it will be suggested that this approach underpins his critique of Kant and Kierkegaard, as well as setting him at odds with Levinas and Darwall (§7.5).