Conformity poses a double-edged sword effect on the evolution of cooperation within heterogeneous endowment populations

Abstract

Understanding the emergence and maintenance of cooperation is crucial for social development, particularly in the context of contemporary wealth inequality. However, the prevalent phenomenon of individual conformity in humans and social animals is often overlooked in the presence of heterogeneous endowments. Motivated by these considerations, we investigate the impact of conformists on cooperation within the population characterized by binary heterogeneous endowments. Our results reveal that the presence of conformists in a population can influence payoff-driven individuals. These conformists can catalyze the establishment of cooperation across rich and poor individuals, enhancing network reciprocity when the multiplication factor is high (i.e., the degree of cooperation synergy is high), but act as Trojan horses eroding cooperation clusters centered around rich cooperators under a low multiplication factor, thus exhibiting a double-edged sword impact on cooperation. Furthermore, consistent results are observed when accounting for individual conformity biases and multiplayer public goods game. Our research findings reveal the impact of conformity-driven behavior on cooperation in the context of heterogeneous endowments, contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of cooperative evolution amidst inequality.