Abstract
Conflict parties are frequently involved in more than one conflict simultaneously. In this paper the structure of local conflicts is modeled as a conflict network where rivals invest in conflict specific technology to attack their respective neighbors. We prove that there exists a unique equilibrium and examine the relation between total conflict investment (a proxy for conflict intensity) and underlying network characteristics. We also identify a class of conflict networks where peaceful conflict resolution is beneficial in the sense that conflict intensity is reduced. Outside of this class peaceful conflict resolution may be detrimental because countervailing local network effects can actually result in higher conflict intensity.
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