Conflict management trajectories: theory and evidence

Abstract

ABSTRACT When multiple attempts to manage a given conflict occur, are these attempts interdependent – and if so, how? Policymakers and practitioners regularly report that such interdependence exists; and yet, explicit theorizing about it remains underdeveloped. The need for theorizing motivates the current study. Using the concept of a conflict management trajectory as a foundation, I develop four models that potentially link successive conflict management efforts together: a cost model, a limited cost model, a learning model, and a baseline model. I then test these models’ predictions empirically with data on diplomatic interventions during the period 1946–2000 (i.e., verbal pleas, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, humanitarian and other administrative tasks, and peace operations). The analysis shows that the limited cost model best explains interdependence among conflict management attempts. In that model, states balance their desire to do something with their incentive to minimize costs. This creates an intervention ‘threshold’ beyond which third parties less frequently travel – particularly if that threshold has not yet been crossed in a given dispute. Third-party intervention overwhelmingly resides on the less costly end of the spectrum, exceeding the costs associated with mediation rarely. If a third party crosses that threshold, the probability of further intervention on the high-cost side of the threshold rises, but third parties still prefer to return to low-cost conflict management strategies. It seems, therefore, that rational considerations dominate, as third parties work to achieve the benefits of peace for the lowest possible price.