Abstract

The article examines the EU’s crisis strategy in Sudan and South Sudan in conditions of acute armed confrontation between the Sudanese army and forces of rapid reaction. The reasons for increased attention of the EU to these states with intensive internal armed conflicts have been analyzed. The author has noted that towards these states the EU’s crisis strategy has been oriented in the direction of extended application of instruments of «soft power». The motives for refusal of the EU to utilize in the given region the traditional hard-core missions with military and civil components have been examined. In the context of utilization of «soft power» priority attention is devoted to consideration of a new model of the EU’s indirect mediation in Sudan and South Sudan based on providing by the EU assistance to mediation of the «third party». The author underlines that indirect mediation of the EU is built in the EU’s crisis strategy by means of controlling the allocation of financial and other resources provided to its local mediation partners. The conclusion is made that the EU’s indirect mediation could be a prospective and effective instrument of «soft power» concerning complex crisis situations with practical retainment by the EU control over the mediation process

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