Abstract
Abstract This concluding chapter provides a summary of the previous four chapters and explains how the fine-grained analysis defended in those chapters ultimately vindicates the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). It is argued that we have reason to be suspicious of, and ultimately to reject, our initial intuition that agents in Frankfurt cases are morally responsible for doing what they couldn’t have avoided doing and, consequently, that Frankfurt cases aren’t counterexamples to the principle. It is further argued that, given the fine-grained analysis of the Frankfurt cases defended in the preceding chapters, the Frankfurt cases actually provide further confirmation of PAP.
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