Abstract
Confirmation delay is decomposed to better understand both when and why the Senate augments its efforts to vet presidential nominees. Distinctions among expedited, normal, and protracted confirmation processes are analyzed, as well as those between the work of Senate standing committees and chamber floor. A theory of ex ante moral hazard reduction is proposed that predicts as the confirmation process becomes increasingly protracted in response to rising potential agency costs, the Senate will be increasingly swifter to confirm tier 1 top executive leaders to US federal agency leadership positions than tier 2 subordinate leadership nominees. The statistical evidence is consistent with this theory of differential vetting between nominee tiers for both Senate party polarization and the nominee’s loyalty to the appointing president, as well as for agency decision-making independence restricted to protracted confirmation processes. Yet, such differential vetting is not empirically observed in response to interbranch policy conflict.
Published Version
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