Abstract
We provide in this note some analytical representations for the probability of the Condorcet paradox when voter indifference between alternatives is allowed. The probability of having a Condorcet winner is also considered. Our results show that indifference reduces the likelihood of the paradox, thus improving the ability of the majority rule to aggregate individual preferences. However, indifference also decreases the probability of having a strict Condorcet winner and, for small electorates, the probability of having a Condorcet winner.
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