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Abstract This discussion addresses a number of topics relating to the author’s perspective on our life in groups and, in particular, our collective psychology as this is understood in everyday life. It first compares the author’s account of collective intentions with that of Michael Bratman from the point of view of “creature construction,” estimating that creatures endowed with collective intentions according to the author’s account would be more efficient in carrying out tasks requiring the contributions of two or more of them. Turning to collective emotions, it distinguishes collective emotions on the author’s account from otherconsequential emotion-related aspects of life in groups, including “feeling-rules”, which may be directed to both individuals and groups. It makes a related point about beliefs, alluding in particular to pluralistic ignorance, which related collective beliefs as those are understood by the author would be apt to explain. It goes on to spotlight the idea that conversation—a central component of life in groups—is a context for collective-belief formation, linking this point to classic positions in the philosophy of language of David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. Next it turns to collective moral responsibility and responds to some critical comments on the author’s account of this. Finally, it briefly explores the relationship of joint commitment thinking to moral thinking, arguing in relation to some suggestions from Michael Tomasello that though joint commitment thinking may be an important prompt for moral thinking, it should be distinguished from it.