Conclusion

Abstract

Measurement of the value of United States bases in the United Kingdom, in terms of whether the UK faces a greater danger or enhanced protection as a result of the American forces stationed there, is necessarily subjective. However, two general trends can be discerned. The first is a growing feeling in the United States that Europeans generally should be prepared to play a greater role in their own defence, and this includes financial contributions. Britain herself has far too long relied upon American and her own nuclear weapons for the bulk of the defence effort, at the cost of running down conventional forces. Duncan Sandys, as Minister of Defence in 1957, presided over a massive cut-back in conventional forces, thereby increasing reliance upon nuclear deterrence. In outlining Britain’s new look defence policy, Sandys said that ‘it must be well understood that, if Russia were to launch a major attack on them [Western nations], even with conventional forces only, they would have to hit back with strategic nuclear weapons’.1 As Field Marshal Lord Carver has observed,2 the idea that NATO could avert defeat by initiating nuclear war is dangerous and irresponsible; it can only end in ‘greater defeat’. It is therefore up to the United Kingdom and Europeans generally to reassess the need for the plethora of NATO — particularly American nuclear weapons.