Conclusion

Abstract

This concluding chapter argues that states without nuclear weapons have pursued a variety of means when challenging or resisting a nuclear-armed opponent during intense political disputes that seemed to be worsening. The most direct way to reduce conflict in nuclear monopoly, then, is to address the underlying political disputes. Yet when political disputes occurred, nonnuclear weapon states devised strategies around nuclear monopoly. These strategies took advantage of the costs and benefits associated with nuclear use for the nuclear-armed state. The nonnuclear weapon state (NNWS) leaders discounted the likelihood of nuclear use when they perceived the costs of use as outweighing the benefits for their opponent. They tempted fate, pursuing strategies that they believed would fall short of their opponent's red line for nuclear use. The chapter then looks at several common elements across the case studies as the NNWS probed the limits of the nuclear shadow. It also considers some broader implications for nuclear strategy and politics.