Conclusion

Abstract

In this book, I have argued in favour of the Frege-Strawson theory ofdefinite descriptions. I have shown how it can be integrated into anexplicit compositional formal semantics and I hope to have shown how itcan deal with a wide range of data, including some traditionally held tobe problematic for it. The Fregean theory has been shown in a positivelight when compared to the Russellian theory of definite descriptions,which I take to be its main competitor. It arguably deals better thanthe Russellian theory with the following phenomena: the interaction ofdefinite descriptions with negation; the mixture of truth-valuejudgements obtained when examining presupposition obviation data; thereferential/attributive distinction; and the readings available whendescriptions are embedded under conditionals, propositional attitudeverbs, possibility modals, and other operators. I know of no phenomenathat the Russellian theory handles better than the Fregean theory.