Conceptualizing the European Union Legislative Process: Some Insight from the Federalist Papers

Abstract

This article links the discussions which are currently centring on the future design of the European Union legislative process to modern constitutional political theory as exemplified in the Federalist Papers. It argues that, to better understand the European Union policy–making process, analysts are well advised to consult the Federalist’s objectives as well as its method of reasoning. Considering institutional design in general and legislative decision–making in particular, Jean Monnet, one of the principal architects of modern–day Europe, perceived the early developments which led to the Treaty that established the European Coal and Steel Community of 1952 as an unprecedented process. However, although the European Union is indeed novel, and not a state in the traditional sense, the dialogue in Europe would benefit from a more constitutionally oriented assessment of the potential effects of the Union’s institutional arrangements on legislative outcomes. Modern constitutional theory can provide the basis for this assessment. Without assuming the Constitution of the United States for itself, the European debate on legislative design would be enriched by looking back at the Federalist’s reasoning.