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Abstract
AbstractThis chapter discusses three case studies of conceptual relativity in scientific practice and their philosophical implications. I argue that scientists with different explanatory interests often recognize different patterns and therefore rely on different ontologies. I specify this claim by discussing three case studies (species, extended cognition, and intelligence) that illustrate conceptual relativity in the empirical sciences. I conclude that there is not only one correct answer to the question what species exist, not only one correct answer to the question whether extended cognitive processes exist, and not only one correct answer to the question how many intelligences exist. Furthermore, I argue that conceptual relativity in scientific practice is compatible with a realism that accepts moderate notions of natural kinds and insists that scientific entities exist in virtue of a reality that is largely independent of our conceptual choices. Finally, I argue that the ubiquity of conceptual relativity in scientific practice challenges metaphysicians who insist on the ideal of exactly one fundamental ontology in philosophy.KeywordsConceptual RelativityNatural KindSpecies ConceptBiological Species ConceptHomeostatic Property ClusterThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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