Conceptual Relativity in Philosophy

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This chapter discusses arguments for conceptual relativity and their philosophical implications. I start with the ideal of exactly one fundamental ontology as it is common in analytic metaphysics. Contemporary metaphysicians often try to step behind the plurality of ordinary ontologies by employing a distinction between “ordinary” and “fundamental” existence questions. While we use a wide range of ontologies in ordinary and scientific contexts, the goal of metaphysicians is to evaluate what exists in the most fundamental sense. Conceptual relativists like Putnam and Hirsch reject the metaphysical appeal to exactly one fundamental ontology and therefore endorse a substantive conceptual pluralism. I consider a range of arguments for conceptual relativity that are based on considerations of understandability (“we do not even understand claims about a supposedly fundamental ontology”) and epistemic access (“we could never figure out what entities fundamentally exist”). While I endorse conceptual relativity, I acknowledge that debates about these arguments usually end in an intellectual stalemate. I therefore propose to shift attention from conceptual relativity in philosophical thought experiments to conceptual relativity in scientific practice.