CONCEPTUAL PREMISES FOR SKETCHING A RATIONALE FOR THE INSTITUTION OF PRESCRIPTION

Abstract

The author observes that the concerns of substantiating the institution of prescription belong to the theory of civil law and that the presentations of the civil model are made separately for the two forms of prescription (extinctive and acquisitive). This, in a context where criminal jurisprudence faces one of the most intense debates on how to apply the criminal rules regarding the prescription of criminal liability, a debate which, however, omits the idea of substantiating the institution. The thesis is updated according to which time - movement in sequence of events, external and unavoidable natural element of subjective rights - is presented as a modality of obligations, a concept that can be used both in the scope of civil and criminal norms. Time with the stated legal meaning can be accepted as the basis of prescription. The model offers a consistent methodological potential for the hypotheses in which the legal norm - whatever its origin - finds its meaning with difficulty. Hence the consequence: the subjective rights - interests with high legal protection of the subjects in the relationship - placed in time, can be understood in a unitary way and applied to all branches of law.