Abstract
Abstract: this paper discusses the use of certain terms associated to I. Kant’s account of inner experience. Inner experience is a subject matter relevant in Kant’s thought, which encompasses metaphysical and anthropological issues worthy of consideration. By examining the Critique of Pure Reason and the Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, one can see the confused use of the terms: inner sense, empirical, pure, and transcendental apperception, discursive and intuitive self-consciousness, consciousness of oneself divided into reflection and apprehension, intellectual and empirical consciousness of one’s existence. Therefore, I focus on the philosophical meaning of the previous terms and their relation to the problem of inner experience, which depends upon the outer experience. Finally, I deal with the problem of the content of inner sense, suggesting that its content does not correspond to a single, simple thing, but rather to a flux of inner representations.
Highlights
Abstract: this paper discusses the use of certain terms associated to I
He argued for its differentiation, claiming that inner sense should constitute the subject matter of psychology, whereas apperception should be that of logic (Kant, 1900, AA 7:141; 1998, CPR A106-7, B132; Schulting, 2015)
Empirical apperception is identified with a certain form of self-consciousness in the CPR and in Metaphysika Dohna (1792-3), where Kant claims: “we name only one inner sense - the faculty of the consciousness of one’s own existence - in time empirical apperception” (Kant, 1900, AA 28:673)
Summary
Kant points out in CPR2 B152 that inner sense was identified with the faculty of apperception in the systems of psychology during the XVIII century. The second group related to the empirical self-consciousness, elicited by our inner sense, points out an empirical consciousness of oneself that operates at the empirical, intuitive, subjective or psychological level of human cognition The latter form of cognition should not be thought of as a source of chaotic unrelated representations but as representations temporally related of our own existence, which are subject to the synthesis of our understanding. On this point, I am in agreement with Aquila’s claim that “what Kant calls “empirical apperception,” or “inner sense,” is the awareness of oneself insofar as one is aware of particular stretches of intuited time “synthesizable” together with others into the right sort of whole” I am in agreement with Aquila’s claim that “what Kant calls “empirical apperception,” or “inner sense,” is the awareness of oneself insofar as one is aware of particular stretches of intuited time “synthesizable” together with others into the right sort of whole” (Aquila, 1983, p. 175)
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