Apercepcja i sąd. Rozważania wokół transcendentalnej dedukcji kategorii

Abstract

In the present paper I discuss the different ways of describing transcendental apperception (TA) that we encounter in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The question is: do these definitions together yield a coherent characterization of TA? I analyze an interpretation that identifies TA with self-consciousness, with a reflexive act. Such an understanding does not seem entirely correct. A more appropriate would appear (to be) an interpretation that begins with the role that TA plays in imposing unity on different presentations in judgment. From this perspective TA reveals itself as the factor responsible for creating the intentional feature of empirical acts, and ultimately, as the necessary condition of an object as a phenomenon. Moreover, when we define TA as “the highest principle” we can treat it as something analogous to the laws or principles of physics.