Abstract
This paper does two things. First, it argues for a metaphilosophical view of conceptual analysis questions; in particular, it argues that the facts that settle conceptual-analysis questions are facts about the linguisticintentions of ordinary folk. Thesecondthingthispaperdoesisarguethatifthismetaphilosophicalviewiscorrect, then experimental philosophy (or "x-phi") is a legitimate methodology to use in trying to answer conceptual-analysis questions.
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