Does Scientific Conceptual Analysis Provide Better Justification than Armchair Conceptual Analysis?

Abstract

The present paper is concerned with the question of whether scientific conceptual analysis provides better justification than armchair conceptual analysis. In order to address this question, I provide exact definitions of armchair conceptual analysis and scientific conceptual analysis. Furthermore, I use a certain criticism of armchair conceptual analysis, raised by experimental philosophers, as a basis for an argument to the conclusion that scientific conceptual analysis provides better justification than armchair conceptual analysis, and consider the expertise defence as a possible response to this argument. The argument is based on the idea that the concept of a common usage implies a certain degree of uniformity among different speakers, and can be called ‘argument from uniformity of agreement’. The expertise defence can be understood as an attack of one of the premises of this argument. Finally, I present and discuss the results from an empirical study in which scientific conceptual analysis was used in order to gather evidence as regards the soundness of the argument from uniformity of agreement and the expertise defence.