Abstract
This paper asks (a) how new scientific objects of research are conceptualized at a point in time when little is known about them, and (b) how those conceptualizations, in turn, figure in the process of investigating the phenomena in question. Situating my approach vis-à-vis existing notions of concepts, I propose to think of concepts as research tools. Narrowing my focus to phenomena in cognitive neuropsychology (specifically: the phenomenon of implicit memory), I develop an account of how concepts can function as tools. This account is based on an original reconstruction of the nature and function of operationism in psychology
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