Concealed Chosen Plaintext Attack on Multiple S-boxes Based Image Encryption

Abstract

Chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) pose a significant security risk to encryption algorithms. However, it can be difficult to perform such an attack without direct access to the encryption process. This paper introduces a new cryptoanalysis method that uses hidden CPA to analyze image encryption schemes based on substitution boxes (S-boxes) Unlike traditional CPA methods, the proposed algorithm does not require that they can directly into the encryption process. Instead, a hidden attack vector is embedded in the natural host image to reduce the risk of attack detection. By asking the owner of the encryption algorithm to encrypt this encryption image and provide a cipher image, the input vector can be compared with its encrypted counterpart This can have an effective S-box and break encryption the algorithm, which does not interact directly with the encryption process. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can completely recover cipher images in cascading S-box encryption schemes, regardless of the number of S-boxes used. Additionally, it conceals the CPA vector within the host image imperceptibly, achieving a high PSNR of 49.47 dB, indicating minimal visual distortion. Furthermore, our CPA significantly outperforms existing techniques in speed, recovering a grayscale image in just 1.2 seconds. This method provides a simple yet effective cryptanalysis tool to evaluate the security of such image encryption schemes against CPAs.