Abstract
Successful performance in cooperative activities relies on efficient task distribution between co-actors. Previous research found that people often forgo individual efficiency in favor of co-efficiency (i.e., joint-cost minimization) when planning a joint action. The present study investigated the cost computations underlying co-efficient decisions. We report a series of experiments that tested the hypothesis that people compute the joint costs of a cooperative action sequence by summing the individual action costs of their co-actor and themselves. We independently manipulated the parameters quantifying individual and joint action costs and tested their effects on decision making by fitting and comparing Bayesian logistic regression models. Our hypothesis was confirmed: people weighed their own and their partner’s costs similarly to estimate the joint action costs as the sum of the two individual parameters. Participants minimized the aggregate cost to ensure co-efficiency. The results provide empirical support for behavioral economics and computational approaches that formalize cooperation as joint utility maximization based on a weighted sum of individual action costs.
Highlights
Humans cooperate by sharing goals with others, and by planning and coordinating actions with their partners to achieve these goals (Bratman, 1992; Butterfill, 2017; Sebanz et al, 2006)
We investigated an alternative hypothesis, according to which the equality of contribution matters more than the efficiency of joint performance
Participants chose the object resulting in a co-efficient action sequence 77% of the time, which was significantly higher than chance at 66%2 (V = 7260, p < .001, r = 1.00)
Summary
Humans cooperate by sharing goals with others, and by planning and coordinating actions with their partners to achieve these goals (Bratman, 1992; Butterfill, 2017; Sebanz et al, 2006). People are often motivated to reduce payoff inequality in economic games (Dawes et al, 2007; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), and it is possible that in a joint action context they minimize the difference in the action costs distributed across co-actors rather than maximizing the expected utility of the dyad Such decisions may be based on a motivation to be fair to an interaction partner (Rand et al, 2013), recent results support the co-efficiency hypothesis against the trial-based fairness account (Strachan & Török, 2020)
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