Abstract
In order to optimize the safety regulatory mode and enhance the effectiveness of safety regulation for Chinese government regulators, this paper carry out the comparative analysis of the benefits between compliance supervision mode (CSM) and self-regulation mode (SRM) based on the perspective of evolutionary game theory. Taking the social environment of Chinese industry as an example, the game model of government and company participation under the CSM and SRM has been established and solved. The results of comparing the total payoff of the two regulatory modes show that the payoff of adopting an independent regulatory model are less than the compliance regulatory model in China. Under the pure strategy, it is unstable that the government players chose a strategy corresponding to the CSM. In addition, this new research perspective can also be used to explore government safety regulatory decisions in other countries.
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