Complex Interdependence and Transnational Lobbying: South Korea in the United States

Abstract

With the rise of interdependence, transnational lobbying has emerged as an important instrument of bilateral bargaining among nations. I construct a typology of transnational lobbying based on four variables: power, knowledge, mutual interests, and ethnic and ideological ties. A case study of South Korea's lobbying in the United States is employed to examine how, and under what conditions, these different lobbying strategies are adopted, and to what extent they are effective. The Korean case shows that transnational lobbying is a supplementary and defensive tactic to assist formal diplomatic bargaining; that indirect lobbying involving coalition building and grass-roots mobilization are more effective than direct ones based on access to power and use of expertise; and that the choice and effectiveness of lobbying strategy are influenced not only by the degree of preexisting transnational resources (e.g., purchasing power, corporate constituents, ethnic base, and ideological ties), but also by the political, social, and cultural contexts of the countries involved.