Competition with Hidden Knowledge

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Previous articleNext article No AccessCompetition with Hidden KnowledgeJohn G. RileyJohn G. Riley Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 93, Number 5Oct., 1985 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/261344 Views: 9Total views on this site Citations: 38Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1985 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Ivija Bernatović, Alenka Slavec Gomezel, Matej Černe Mapping the knowledge-hiding field and its future prospects: a bibliometric co-citation, co-word, and coupling analysis, Knowledge Management Research & Practice 20, no.33 (Jun 2021): 394–409.https://doi.org/10.1080/14778238.2021.1945963Stephen Fox, Adrian Kotelba Organizational Neuroscience of Industrial Adaptive Behavior, Behavioral Sciences 12, no.55 (May 2022): 131.https://doi.org/10.3390/bs12050131Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, François Salanié Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection, American Economic Review 111, no.88 (Aug 2021): 2623–2659.https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190189Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, François Salanié Concurrence non exclusive et sélection adverse, Revue économique Vol. 69, no.66 (Nov 2018): 1009–1023.https://doi.org/10.3917/reco.696.1009John G. 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Stoughton Managerial Compensation: Linear-Sharing vs. Bonus-Incentive Plans Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection, (Jan 1988): 319–347.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2667-7_12John G. Riley Signalling, (Nov 2016): 1–6.https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_1557-1Patricia J. Hughes Signalling by direct disclosure under asymmetric information, Journal of Accounting and Economics 8, no.22 (Jun 1986): 119–142.https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(86)90014-5Sheridan Titman, Brett Trueman Information quality and the valuation of new issues, Journal of Accounting and Economics 8, no.22 (Jun 1986): 159–172.https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(86)90016-9