Abstract
An interesting result of a first price auction model with incomplete information is obtained. Under a specific condition, an increase in the number of bidders increases the equilibrium expected information acquisition expenditures of all bidders and decreases the expected bid revenue to a seller. Competition among bidders in the form of entry and private information acquisition is not profitable to a seller.
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