Abstract

With the rise of the sharing economy and the concept of "green environmental protection and low-carbon travel," the emerging project of shared electric vehicles is booming. However, the accompanying coordination problem between shared electric vehicles and public transportation system needs to be urgently solved. In reality, customers' choice of travel mode is influenced by their own travel perceived utility. Thus, this paper will discuss the competition and coordination problem between shared electric vehicles and public transportation system from the perspective of customer travel utility. Considering the travel cost and comfort in the customer travel utility, the game models of shared electric vehicle and public transportation system in different scenarios are established by using competitive game and cooperative game. Then, the equilibrium solutions under different scenarios are obtained by solving the models. The analysis results show that shared electric vehicles would bring some beneficial improvements to the transportation system under certain circumstances. Furthermore, public transportation system should adopt a coordinative strategy with the shared electric vehicles to promote the total customer travel utility for the entire system. It is worth considering the improvement of the service quality of shared electric vehicle and public transportation, which would affect the rate of increasing in the total customer travel utility.

Highlights

  • During the past decades, bus, subways and other public transport (PT) as well as private car (PC) have played an important role in urban transportation

  • Based on the above analysis, it is essential to study the coordination and competition between shared electric vehicle (SEV) and PT from the perspective of customer travel utility, which is consisting of travel comfort and price

  • This paper aims to solve the competition and coordination problem between SEV and PT

Read more

Summary

Introduction

Bus, subways and other public transport (PT) as well as private car (PC) have played an important role in urban transportation. A customer could choose from the following three ways to travel: the first way is to take the bus, the second is to drive a SEV, and the third is to take the bus to an adjacent SEV station and transfer a SEV to the destination On such a journey, the relationship between the bus and SEV is both competition and coordination. Based on the above analysis, it is essential to study the coordination and competition between SEV and PT from the perspective of customer travel utility, which is consisting of travel comfort and price. This is the motivation of our study. The competition and coordination problem between SEV and PT is analyzed through considering the transfer behavior of customers between different travel modes. Based on the reality and previous studies, the basic assumptions and the customer travel utility function are given in this part

Basic assumptions
Travel utility function
The competitive game between PT and SEV
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
The cooperative game between PT and SEV
Findings
Simulation experiment and analysis
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call