Abstract
The national housing budget is determined by many variables in addition to that of housing deficit. Electoral competition is one of these variables and thus becomes a key aspect to study in order to understand one of the driving forces behind housing investment. Through quantitative-descriptive methods and correlational analysis, this paper uses secondary information to examine the Chilean public budget and the results of presidential elections over the 1990-2015 period. The results suggest that each administration modified the housing budget during electoral periods, a situation that grew in intensity when there was greater opposition. In addition, it is possible to observe that the ruling parties demonstrated their economic power through “costly gestures” with major investments and the provision of housing subsidies to validate their capacity. However at the same time, like in a “repetitive game” voters observed that these efforts were only made during electoral years, thus being interpreted as electoral populism instead of a demonstration of efficacy.
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