Compassionate Deism and the Grammar of Permission

Ronald Hall

doi:10.3390/rel12030200

Abstract

Both theism and atheism assume that God permits evil. But neither theism nor atheism make this assumption with due attention to what I call, following Wittgenstein, the grammar of the term ‘permission’. When this grammar is examined, it becomes clear that this assumption cannot avoid the atheistic force of the argument from evil. To rescue belief in God, I propose the adoption of a position I call compassionate deism. This position is a combination of Christian theism and traditional deism. The combination is produced by making a slight deistic modification of Christian theism in the direction of non-intervention, and a slight modification of deism in the direction of compassion. Such a compassionate deism denies the common assumption made by both Christian theism and atheism, namely, that God permits evil, and thus avoids the theistic denial of the reality of evil and the atheist’s denial of God’s goodness.

Highlights

Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations
Perhaps compassionate deism can offer a plausible defense for why God saw fit to design chance into the natural world
We can think of deism as a response to the atheist’s argument from evil

Summary

Introduction

Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. The atheist assumes that God permits the existence of gratuitous suffering but that he does not, when he could, intervene to deny this permission. The Christian theist asks us to believe that God permits suffering and sometimes intervenes to stop or prevent it, which implies he has this power of intervention, and sometimes he does not exercise it.

Results

Conclusion