Defining Atheism and the Burden of Proof

Abstract

AbstractIn this paper I demonstrate how certain contemporary atheists have problematically conflatedatheismwithagnosticism(knowingly or unknowingly). The first type of conflation issemantic fusion, where the lack of belief in God is combined with the outright denial of God, under the single label of ‘atheism’. The second ismorphological fissionwhich involves the separation of atheism into two subcategories where lack of belief in God is labelled asnegativeatheism and outright denial of God aspositiveatheism – and while here they are more explicitly demarcated, they are still positioned under the broad notion of atheism. I argue in this paper that atheism should be better used as thepropositional denialof God and thatuncertaintyandunknowability about Godshould be reserved to characterise agnosticism. Conflating these positions under the single term ‘atheism’ mischaracterises agnostics and inflates the territory of atheists. In clarifying these terms, I review how the nuances in the prefixa-in atheism have potentially contributed towards these misnomers. I also suggest the use of the categories ‘local atheism’ and ‘global atheism’ to clarify on whom the burden of proof lies within the discourse.