Abstract
We consider the problem of choosing a committee from a set of available candidates through a randomized social choice function when there are restrictions on the committee to be formed and agents have separable preferences over the committees. We show that when the set of feasible committees is non-vacuously restricted, that is, cannot be seen as the set of all committees with a subset of members, a random social choice function is onto and strategy-proof if and only if it is random dictatorial.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
