Comedy, consensus, and conflict framework: Comedy as a norm violation can build consensus or escalate conflict in negotiations

Abstract

In this work, we propose that humor violates norms that can build consensus or escalate conflict in negotiations. Drawing on social identity theory, we propose that humor commits norm violations that are more likely to be perceived as benign among ingroup observers in negotiations, but perceived as offensive to outgroup observers in negotiations. We introduce the Comedy, Consensus, and Conflict Framework to shed light on the interpersonal effect of humor on negotiations. When humor is expressed to an ingroup observer, relative to neutral communication, humor is more likely to violate weak norms that govern social group membership resulting in the violation as being perceived as benign, which promotes cooperative behaviors in negotiations such as concessions and collaborative problem-solving. By contrast, when humor is expressed to an outgroup observer, relative to neutral communication, humor is more likely to violate strong norms that define social group membership resulting in the violation as being interpreted as offensive, which triggers competitive behaviors in negotiations such as aggressive offers and hardened positions. Furthermore, we suggest that humor not only generates appraisals of social identity threats, but also affective responses that influence negotiation behavior. Finally, we expand our theoretical model about humor to consider relational factors that influence norm strength, which motivates whether negotiators appraise norm violations as offensive or benign.