Abstract
Collusion, predation and merger in buses should each be viewed as attempts by firms to restore and improve profits following deregulation in 1985. Their analysis by competition authorities should define the entry conditions which deregulation in 1985 exposed, and the changes since, including some raised barriers. Effective pro-competitive action depends on modifying these conditions. The analysis of predation and merger in buses performed by the Office of Fair Trading and the Monopolies and Mergers Commissions are assessed in this light. Some evidence linking the registration since 1985 of agreements in restraint of trade, denoting collusion, with greater than average entry, and other parameters, is presented. (Author/TRRL)
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