Abstract
We consider the problem of aggregating individual approval ballots into one collective approval ballot. An approval ballot is simply a subset of a given set of alternatives. An individual may approve of as many alternatives as he or she wishes. Each approval is counted as a vote. We show that if an aggregation rule is neutral, consistent and discerning, then an alternative is collectively approved of if it receives a number of votes greater than the mean number of votes received by the alternatives and is not approved of if it receives a number of votes less than the mean.
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